

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

DRC-01 /153 W

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R 141720Z AUG 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7164

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BONN

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4411

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: UK PAPER ON USE OF DATA

REF: A) STATE 108719; B) STATE 164929

1. UK REP AT AUGUST 12 SPC MEETING DISTRIBUTED A PAPER ON USE OF DATA WHICH UK DEL HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM LONDON. TEXT FOLLOWS AT END OF THIS MESSAGE. UK APPROACH ON OVERALL GROUND MANPOWER FIGURES IS COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. APPROACH AS OUTLINED IN REF A, I.E. FLEXIBILITY FOR VIENNA, ON UNDERSTANDING VIENNA WILL BEFORE USING FIGURES TRY AGAIN TO ELICIT COMPARABLE FIGURES FROM WP. SIMILARLY UK CAN AGREE TO USE OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY GROUND MANPOWER FIGURES BY AHG WHEN IT IS CLEAR WP PREPARED ENGAGE IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF DATA AND PROVIDE EQUALLY DETAILED FIGURES OF THEIR OWN. HOWEVER, UK APPROACH DIFFERS FROM OUTS ON AIR FOREC MANPOWER, WHERE, IF WP DISAGREES WITH NATO ESTIMATES THAT THE FIGURES ARE CLOSE, AHG WOULD ASK THEM TO TABLE THEIR FIGURES. UK APPROACH DOES NOT RELATE DATA
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DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST TO FORCE CATEGORIZATION ISSUE AS ENVISAGED BY PARA 5, REF B, BUT THE UK PAPER IN PARA 8 DOES SUGGEST HOW DATA MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO CATEGORIZATION EXERCISE.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON UK APPROACH, PARTICULARLY PARA 8, IN THE GUIDANCE NOW UNDER PREPARATION ON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MBFR: USE OF DATA

1. WE BELIEVE THAT AN EARLY EAST/WEST DISCUSSION OF DATA WILL BE NECESSARY IF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS ARE TO GET UNDER WAY; AND THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO URGE THEIR WARSAW PACT COLLEAGUES TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN THIS RESPECT.

2. IN DECIDING WHETHER OR HOW TO USE CERTAIN TYPES OF DATA IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT THE ALLIES WILL NEED TO BE GUIDED BOTH BY CONSIDERATIONS OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND OF THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THERE MAY ALSO IN SOME INSTANCES BE PROBLEMS OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS SET OUT OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON THE USE OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF DATA REFERRED TO IN THE AD HOC GROUP'S REPORT.

NEW FIGURES FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER

3. THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY QUOTED IN PLENARY SESSION FIGURES FOR OVERALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND FOR US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. NOW THAT THE ALLIES HAVE AGREED ON NEW FIGURES FOR THESE CATEGORIES THERE IS IN OUR VIEW NO REASON ON SECURITY

GROUND NOT TO TELL THE WARSAW PACT THAT OUR ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN REVISED. WE SUGGEST THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS BE GIVEN DISCRETION ON WHEN AND HOW TO DO THIS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL, BEFORE QUOTING THE REVISED FIGURES, TRY ONCE MORE TO ELICIT COMPARABLE WARSAW PACT ESTIMATES OR WARSAW PACT COMMENTS ON THE ALLIED FIGURES.

4. WE ASSUME HOWEVER THAT BEFORE THESE NEW FIGURES ARE QUOTED TO THE WARSAW PACT THE ALLIES WILL HAVE AGREED A POSITION ON WHETHER THEY CARRY ANY IMPLICATION FOR THE LEVEL OF THE GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING.

WE DO NOT THINK THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD THEMSELVES VOLUNTEER ANY COMMENT ON THE LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING BUT THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO A WARSAW PACT QUESTION ON WHETHER THE FIGURE IS CONFIDENTIAL

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OF 700,000 STILL STANDS.

AIR FORCE MANPOWER FIGURES

5. UNLESS THE ALLIES DECIDE TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME WAY WE SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN QUOTING SPECIFIC FIGURES FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT. BUT IF IN THE INFORMAL EXCHANGES WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES CRITICISE THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING BECAUSE OF THE EXCLUSION FROM IT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER OR ALLUDE TO AIR FORCE MANPOWER

IN SOME OTHER WAY, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MIGHT IN OUR VIEW RESPOND BY SAYING THAT ACCORDING TO ALLIED ESTIMATES THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS OF THE TWO SIDES ARE VERY CLOSE BUT WITH A SLIGHT WARSAW

PACT

SUPERIORITY. IF THE WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES DISPUTE THIS,
ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD INVITE THEM TO TABLE THEIR OWN FIGURES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4411

BREAK DOWN OF GROUND FORCES COUNTRY BY COUNTRY

6. WE BELIEVE THAT WHEN A SERIOUS EAST/WEST DISCUSSION OF DATA GETS
UNDER WAY ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL BE OBLIGED TO GIVE A COUNTRY BY
COUNTRY BREAKDOWN OF THE ALLIANCE'S GROUND FORCE TOTAL. WE DO NOT
BELIEVE THAT A DISCUSSION ON ANY OTHER BASIS - EG ON AN OVERALL
FUNCTIONAL BASIS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES' FORCE
HOLDINGS - WOULD BE FEASIBLE. WE RECOGNISE HOWEVER THAT THERE ARE
POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES, THOUGH NOT IN OUR VIEW SERIOUS ONES, IN THIS
WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATORS MAY INTERPRET IT AS IMPLYING ALLIED

ACCEPTANCE OF THE THESIS THAT REDUCTIONS WILL BE NEGOTIATED ON A
COUNTRY BY COUNTRY BASIS AND OF NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS. ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED CLEARLY TO REBUT ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION.
7. WE BELIEVE THAT A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY BREAKDOWN SHOULD ONLY BE
OFFERED BY ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT IS CLEAR
THAT THEIR WARSAW PACT COLLEAGUES ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS

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DISCUSSION OF DATA AND TO PROVIDE EQUALLY DETAILED FIGURES OF THEIR
OWN.

DATA ON CERTAIN TYPES OF AIR DEFENCE UNITS AND HELICOPTER UNITS

8. THE ALLIES ARE CURRENTLY EXAMINING POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO THEIR EXISTING DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND MAY DECIDE TO INDICATE TO THE WARSAW PACT A WILLINGNESS TO DEFINE GROUND FORCES IN SOME OTHER

WAY, EITHER BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN TYPES OF AIR DEFENCE UNITS FROM THE WARSAW PACT TOTAL AND/OR BY ADDING CERTAIN TYPES OF AIR DEFENCE UNITS TO THE NATO TOTAL. THEY MAY ALSO AGREE THAT CERTAIN WARSAW PACT HELICOPTER UNITS WHICH NATO CURRENTLY ASSESSES AS AIR MANNED SHOULD BE

DEFINED AS "GROUND FORCES." IT IS FOR CONSIDERATION WHETHER, IF THEY DECIDE TO OFFER SUCH MODIFICATIONS, THE ALLIES SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME QUOTE FIGURES FOR THE NUMBERS OF MEN INVOLVED. OUR VIEW IS THAT THE LEAST INITIALLY THEY SHOULD NOT, BUT SHOULD RATHER SEE WHETHER AN OFFER TO REDEFINE GROUND FORCES PROVES TO BE OF INTEREST TO THE WARSAW PACT. IF IT DOES AND WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATORS ASK FOR THE ALLIES' ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBERS INVOLVED ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MIGHT QUOTE A FIGURE FOR ANY NATO UNITS CONCERNED AND INVITE THE WARSAW PACT

REPRESENTATIVES TO SAY WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT IN NUMERICAL TERMS ON THE WARSAW PACT FORCE LEVEL.

MORE DETAILED BREAKDOWN

9. AT SOME STAGE IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF DATA, PERHAPS EVEN INVOLVING EXCHANGES OF ESTIMATES OF MANPOWER TOTALS FOR NATIONAL FORMATIONS AND/OR ESTIMATES OF OVERALL OR NATIONAL

TOTALS FOR MAJOR EQUIPMENTS (EG TANKS, SSM OR HELICOPTER), MAY BE REQUIRED. AT PRESENT AGREED ALLIED FIGURES AT THIS LEVEL OF DETAIL ARE SUBJECT TO A VERY HIGH SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THOUGH THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF DATA OF THIS SORT BEING REQUIRED FOR USE IN THE NEXT SESSION, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD START CONSIDERING WHAT REAL SECURITY RISK THERE WOULD BE IN EXCHANGING DETAILED INFORMA-

TION OR MANPOWER FORMATIONS AND EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS WITH THE WARSAW PACT IN THE MBFR CONTEXT.

END TEXT.

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